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COMMENTS
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND ASYLUM: IS THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PROVIDING ADEQUATE
GUIDANCE FOR ADJUDICATORS?
By Christina Glezakos*
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 7, 2000, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and
the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
proposed a rule stating "generally applicable principles that will
allow for case-by-case adjudication of [asylum] claims based on
domestic violence or other serious harm inflicted by individual
non-state actors."1 This rule would amend the Code of Federal
Regulations, specifically, Title 8, Part 208 pertaining to proce-
dures for asylum and withholding of removal.2 The Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) proposed the rule in In re R-A- 3 to
address certain barriers to a claim that domestic violence could
satisfy the definition of "refugee"4 under established asylum law
* Comments Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 43. J.D. Candidate,
Santa Clara University School of Law; B.A., University of California, Santa Barbara.
1. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,589 (proposed
Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
2. See Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 8 C.F.R. § 208
(2002).
3. In re R-A-, Hein's Interim Decisions Service, Interim Decision 3403 (B.I.A.
1999), vacated by Attorney General, remanded to B.I.A.
4. The term "refugee" is defined as:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in
the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which
such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to re-
turn to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protec-
tion of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of per-
secution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.
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in the United States.5 The rule addresses each component of the
legal definition of "refugee" and seeks to "provide guidance for
the resolution of novel issues in some of the asylum.., claims
that the Department [of Justice] has encountered in recent
years." 6 One such novel claim is the extent to which victims of
domestic violence may be considered to fall within the asylum
laws of the United States. 7
Domestic violence is a social problem that affects women in
every nation.8 Although the international community has re-
cently taken steps toward addressing this form of violence,9 a
disturbing number of countries remain dominated by patriar-
chal social structures that do not recognize gender-based vio-
lence as a punishable offense.10 Social and cultural traditions in
these nations also limit the avenues of redress available to
women who find themselves in traumatic situations.11 Indeed,
the legal systems of many countries provide sanction for domes-
tic violence by recognizing "honor" or "heat of passion" as ac-
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000).
5. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,589.
6. Id.
7. See id.
8. See U.N. CTR. FOR Soc. DEV. AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN IN THE FAMILY at 11-12, U.N. Doc. ST/CSDHA/2, U.N. Sales No.
E.89.IV.5 (1989) [hereinafter WOMEN IN THE FAMILY] (indicating that family violence
plagues women in every society and is part of "every day life"); Pamela Goldberg &
Nancy Kelly, International Human Rights and Violence Against Women, 6 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 195 (1.993) (discussing recent developments in the treatment of violence
against women as human rights restrictions).
9. See U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force
Sept. 3, 1981) (prohibiting discrimination against women and calling on states to
take affirmative action to eradicate such discrimination); U.N. Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 104, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp.
No. 49, at 217, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (1994) [hereinafter Women's Declaration]
(identifying domestic violence as a human rights violation). The fourth World Con-
ference on Women held in Beijing, China, in 1995, at which 190 countries adopted a
Platform for Action which declared that "violence against women constitutes a vio-
lation of basic human rights and is an obstacle to the achievement of the objectives
of equality, development and peace." Report of Fourth World Conference on
Women, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 177/20 (1995).
10. See WOMEN IN THE FAMILY, supra note 8, at 11 (stating that in many coun-
tries domestic violence "has gone largely unpunished, unremarked and has even
been tacitly, if not explicitly, condoned").
11. See, e.g., ROBIN LEVI & REGAN E. RALPH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Too
ITriLE, Too LATE: STATE RESPONSE TO VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (Dorothy Q.
Thomas & Rachel Denber eds., 1997).; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 2000 ANNUAL
REPORT (2000).
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ceptable defenses to domestic violence charges.12
Given this state of affairs, it is no wonder that many women
possess little hope that their own countries will provide protec-
tion against domestic violence. Consequently, there will be times
when a woman's only safe option will be to leave her country
and seek asylum in a foreign nation.13 Nonetheless, the tradi-
tional view of domestic violence as a private matter, coupled
with its international and domestic prevalence, has made United
States' asylum adjudicators hesitant to conclude that such claims
comport with the legal parameters of domestic asylum law.14
This comment examines the legal barriers established by the
BIA in In re R-A-,15 and analyzes whether the proposed rule suf-
ficiently addresses the hurdles established by that case.16 The
comment discusses asylum law in the United States, its evolu-
tion, and how it has traditionally been applied, 17 focusing spe-
cifically on jurisprudence revolving around "particular social
group" to give context to the proposed rule.18 The comment's fo-
cus then shifts to a detailed discussion of the BIA's decision in In
re R-A- in order to identify the problems the case raised for asy-
lum claims based on domestic violence.1 9 The comment con-
cludes with a discussion of whether the proposed rule achieves
its goal of providing a legal framework within which adjudica-
tors can critically analyze asylum claims based on domestic vio-
lence.20 The comment recommends that, in cases of domestic vio-
12. For example, Pakistan, Jordan, and South Africa honor these defenses. See
generally SAMYA BURNEY, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CRIME OR CUSTOM: VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN IN PAKISTAN (Regan E. Ralph & Cynthia Brown eds., 1999);
BINAIFER NOWROJEE & BRONWEN MANBY, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE STATE
RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND RAPE (Bronwen Manby & Dorothy Q. Tho-
mas eds., 1995); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 444-46 (2000). See
also Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Jordanian Parliament Supports Impunity
for Honor Killings (Jan. 27, 2000), available at
http://www.hrw.org/press/2000/01/jordO127.htm.
13. See, e.g., Pamela Goldberg, Anyplace but Home: Asylum in the United States for
Women Fleeing Intimate Violence, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 565, 565-66 (1993) (reciting a
case of a woman named "Nora" who was severely abused by her husband and was
repeatedly denied assistance by law enforcement officials in her home country).
14. See Nancy Kelly, Gender-Related Persecution: Assessing the Asylum Claims of
Women, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 625, 672 (1993).
15. Interim Decision 3403 (B.I.A. 1999), vacated by Attorney General, remanded to
BIA.
16. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
17. See discussion infra Part II.A.
18. See discussion infra Part II.B.
19. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
20. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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lence, asylum should not be denied to a woman who adequately
satisfies the elements of the law.21
II. BACKGROUND
To have a context within which to understand the proposi-
tions of this comment, this comment begins with the legal devel-
opment of asylum law in the United States. The fundamental
purpose of this body of law is to "provide surrogate interna-
tional protection where there is a fundamental breakdown in
state protection." 22
A. Defining and Applying the Term "Refugee"
The 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees (The Convention) 23 was the first international treaty to
adopt a universal definition of "refugee." 24 The Convention de-
fined a refugee as a person who has a well-founded fear of per-
secution for "reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion." 25 Initially, the
United States did not adopt the Convention's definition into
domestic legislation.26 However, in 1980 when the United States
21. See discussion infra Part V.
22. In re R-A-, Hein's Interim Decisions Service, Interim Decision 3403, at 7
(B.I.A. 1999), vacated by Attorney General, remanded to BIA.
23. Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature
July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6260, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention].
24. However, the terms of the Convention limit the definition of refugee to
those persons affected by events occurring before January 1, 1951. See Geneva Con-
vention, supra note 23, at art. 1, at A(2). This definition was expanded by the Proto-
col Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 8791 [hereinafter Protocol], which was drafted
to protect persons who became refugees as a result of events which took place after
January 1, 1951. The United States is not a signatory to the Convention but only to
the Protocol.
25. Article 1(A). Definition of the term "refugee":
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term "refugee, shall apply
to any person who:... 2) As a result of events occurring before January
1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or po-
litical opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of
his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing
to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
Geneva Convention, supra note 23, at art. 1(A).
26. See Maryellen Fullerton, A Comparative Look at Refugee Status Based on Perse-
cution Due to Membership in a Particular Social Group, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 505, 512
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Congress implemented legislation that revised the then-existing
procedures relating to refugees entering the United States, it
adopted the above definition.27
The Refugee Act used language very similar to that in The
Convention, defining refugees as individuals with a "well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nation-
ality, membership in a particular social group, or political opin-
ion."28 Applying this definition is less simple because grants of
asylum are discretionary.29 Applicants wishing to establish eli-
gibility must first overcome several legal obstacles. 30
1. State Action Requirement
Initially, the applicant must demonstrate that the state
committed acts of persecution or threatened persecution. 31 State
responsibility can be imputed from facts demonstrating that the
state refused to act or failed to provide protection to the victim-
ized person from persecution at the hands of a group or indi-
vidual.32
In cases of domestic violence state inaction has often been
difficult to establish. Several elements contribute to this diffi-
culty. First, although states may have legislation forbidding
n.40 (1993) (recognizing that there was no explicit legislation which authorized the
admittance of refugees, rather, Attorneys General were able to exercise their parole
power under section 212 (d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act to admit
refugee groups).
27. The Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
28. See definition of "refugee" supra note 4.
29. Asylum is a form of discretionary relief, meaning that even if an applicant
demonstrates their eligibility for asylum, the judge may still deny the relief sought
in the exercise of discretion. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 443 (1987)
("[A]n alien who satisfies the applicable standard under § 208(a) does not have a
right to remain in the United States; he or she is simply eligible for asylum, if the At-
torney General, in his discretion, chooses to grant it."). Although the judge's discre-
tion is broad, it is not boundless. See Melendez v. United States Dep't of Justice, 926
F.2d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[W]e hold that though the ultimate denial of asylum in
applications brought under § 208(a) of the Act is reviewed for an abuse of discre-
tion, the threshold finding of fact of whether the alien has established a well-
founded fear of persecution qualifying that person for refugee status is reviewable
under the substantial evidence test.").
30. See, e.g., Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 279, 287 (2d Cir. 2000) (explaining that ap-
plicant bears the burden of proof to show that he or she is a refugee within the
meaning of section 101(a)(42)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. section 1101(a)(42)(A)).
31. See, e.g., Villalta, 20 I. & N. Dec. 142, 147 (B.I.A. 1990); H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337
(B.I.A. 1996); In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996); In re Acosta, 19 I. &
N. Dec. 211, 222-23 (B.I.A. 1985).
32. See In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996).
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domestic violence in their legal code, the appropriate authorities
often do not enforce such legislation.33 Further, in cases where
courts have imputed responsibility to the state for private acts,
the applicant has demonstrated either that seeking such assis-
tance would have been futile given the state's general response
to such claims, 34 or that the simple act of seeking such redress
would have caused her greater harm at the hands of her perse-
cutor.35
2. Well-Founded Fear of Persecution
Additionally, the applicant must demonstrate that she has a
"well-founded fear of persecution." 36 The United States Supreme
Court has interpreted "well-founded" to incorporate not purely
an objective inquiry about the rationality of the fear, but also an
inquiry into the individual's subjective belief about her persecu-
tion.37 A twist on the objective standard was articulated in In re
Mogharrabi, 38 in which the BIA recognized that the fear of per-
secution could be viewed as well-founded if a reasonable person
under analogous circumstances would also fear persecution. 39
More often than not, a woman seeking refuge in a foreign
country in order to escape severe domestic violence will not
have a difficult time establishing her subjective fear of persecu-
tion.40 Her testimony can provide adequate evidence of the
trauma she has endured and the lasting fear that such experi-
ences have left her with.41 However, demonstrating the objectiv-
ity of her fear may prove more burdensome. Given the growing
33. See Patricia A. Seith, Escaping Domestic Violence: Asylum as a Means of Protec-
tion for Battered Women, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1804, 1813-15 (1997) (asserting that the
presence of laws forbidding domestic violence disguise the reality that in many
states women have no governmental protection).
34. See In re Kasinga, 21 I.& N. Dec. 357, 367 (B.I.A. 1996) ("[Aicts of violence
and abuse against women in Togo are tolerated by the police; 3) the Government of
Togo has a poor human rights record; and 4) most African women can expect little
governmental protection from FGM.").
35. See S-A-, Hein's Interim Decisions Service, Interim Decision 3433, at
10(B.I.A. 2000) (finding that had respondent sought state protection "respondent
would have been compelled to return to her domestic situation and her circum-
stances may well have worsened").
36. See definition of "refugee" supra note 4.
37. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987).
38. 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
39. See id. at 445.
40. See In re Kasinga, 21 I.& N. Dec. 357, 358-59 (B.I.A. 1996) (pointing to the
applicant's own testimony as evidence of her fear of persecution).
41. See id.
[Vol. 43
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public awareness of the effects of domestic violence and in-
creased literature on the topic, a woman can now utilize expert
testimony to affirm the effects that repetitious episodes of do-
mestic violence have on her psyche.42
Over the years, the BIA and the courts have applied varying
standards to determine what constitutes persecution. Much of
this wavering is due to the fact that no universally accepted
definition of persecution exists.43 Neither Congress, the BIA, nor
the courts have articulated a clear definition.44 Rather, they have
based the requisite harm to prove persecution on a generally ac-
cepted meaning that has evolved from judicial and administra-
tive decisions. 45 The INS Manual46 states that persecution is a
"serious threat of life or freedom on account of"47 one of the five
enumerated asylum grounds, and that "[s]erious violations of
basic human rights can constitute acts of persecution." 48 The Su-
preme Court has held that persecution is "a seemingly broader
concept than threats to 'life or freedom' ' 49 and subsequent deci-
sions by various Courts of Appeal and the BIA have expanded
this interpretation.50 The BIA has also articulated that an appli-
cant need not demonstrate that her persecutor had a putative or
42. See id. at 360-63 (indicating that the Board took notice of additional exhibits
provided by the applicant from various scholars with expertise on the topic of fe-
male genital mutilation).
43. OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON
PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS at para. 51, U.N.
Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng. Rev. (1988).
44. See Alyson Springer, Proposed Rule Addresses Asylum for Victims of Gender-
Based Persecution, 22 REFUGEE REPORTS 1, 3 (2001).
45. See id.
46. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., BASIC LAW MANUAL: ASYLUM,
SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW CONCERNING ASYLUM LAW 25 (1991) [hereinafter INS
MANUAL].
47. Id. at 20.
48. Id.
49. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 428 n.22 (1984).
50. See, e.g., Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641, 647 (9th Cir. 1997). Pitcherskaia
defined persecution as "the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ...
in a way regarded as offensive." Id. (quoting Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1487 (9th
Cir. 1997). The case also stated that "[tihis definition of persecution is objective, in
that it turns not on the subjective intent of the persecutor but rather on what a rea-
sonable person would deem 'offensive.'" Id. See also Singh v. INS, 94 F.3d 1353,
1360 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that persecution is not limited to physical harm and
can include repeated threats in the context of harassment); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d
1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993) (determining that persecution can result from the violation
of one's fundamental beliefs); Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc)
(holding that mental suffering can rise to the level of persecution).
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malignant intent to harm her in order to prove persecution.51
Given this context, the First Circuit has found that mere annoy-
ance or harassment will not suffice to show persecution, while
concluding that it is not necessary to demonstrate threats to life
or freedom. 52
An applicant may satisfy the requirement of persecution or
a well-founded fear of persecution by demonstrating past perse-
cution or, alternatively, by showing a reasonable fear of future
persecution. 53 An alien who establishes past persecution is pre-
sumed to have a well-founded fear of future persecution.5 4 A
country may overcome this presumption by evidence that, since
the time the initial persecution occurred, the country's condi-
tions have improved to the extent that the applicant's fear of
persecution is no longer well-founded 55 or that she may escape
persecution by relocating within her country.56 If the applicant
has shown past persecution, the burden shifts to the INS to
demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the con-
ditions in the country have changed or that the possibility of re-
location exists.5 7
In light of this broad conceptual framework, it seems evi-
dent that a woman who has been the victim of severe and repeti-
tious domestic violence will sufficiently satisfy the threshold re-
quirements to exhibit persecution.5 8  Domestic violence
encompasses conduct such as physical and mental harm, forcing
a woman to perform sexual or other acts against her will, re-
peated emotional or verbal abuse, and even murder.5 9 Given the
gravity of the acts which define domestic violence, the requisite
level of harm necessary to show persecution will almost always
be present.60 Additionally, the international community recently
recognized that domestic violence is a human rights violation,
which strongly supports the claim that conduct categorized as
domestic violence suffices to meet the level of persecution re-
51. See In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996).
52. See Aguilar-Solis v. INS, 168 F.3d 565, 570 (1st Cir. 1999).
53. See Desir v. llchert, 840 F.2d 723, 729 (9th Cir. 1988).
54. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i) (2000).
55. See id.; In re Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16(B.I.A. 1989).
56. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i).
57. See id.
58. See Springer, supra note 44.
59. See Goldberg, supra note 13, at 583.
60. See id.
[Vol. 43
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quired by domestic asylum law. 61
3. "On Account of' Requirement
The statute clearly indicates that acts of persecution, no mat-
ter how egregious, will not be grounds for asylum eligibility
unless they can be shown to be "on account of" race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.62 The United States Supreme Court clarified the extent
of the necessary nexus between the persecution and the claimed
ground for seeking asylum in INS v. Elias-Zacarias.63 The Court
wrote, "since the statute makes motive critical, [the applicant]
must provide some evidence of [motive], direct or circumstan-
tial" 64 by showing that the persecutor targeted the applicant be-
cause of the claimed asylum eligibility ground. 65 In order to sat-
isfy the "on account of" requirement, the applicant must pass a
two-part test.66 First, the applicant must show that her case does
in fact fall into one of the five enumerated grounds for asylum. 67
For example, if the applicant claims that she is being persecuted
for her political opinion, she must demonstrate that she in fact
holds that political opinion.68 Second, the applicant must dem-
onstrate that there is a nexus between her political opinion and
the persecution she fears.69
B. Jurisprudence Involving "Membership in a Particular Social
Group"
As highlighted by the above discussion, gender-based vio-
lence is not one of the enumerated grounds upon which a
woman may base an asylum claim. 70 Thus, a woman basing her
asylum application on domestic violence must structure her ar-
gument so that it fits into one of the five enumerated grounds. 71
One approach frequently used to circumvent this problem is as-
61. See G.A. Res. 104, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 217, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/48/104 (1993).
62. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000).
63. See 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
64. Id. at 483.
65. See id.
66. See, e.g., In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985).
67. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992).
68. See id. at 483.
69. See id.
70. See definition of "refugee" supra note 4.
71. See definition of "refugee" supra note 4.
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serting that a woman's well-founded fear of persecution due to
domestic violence is "on account of" her membership in a par-
ticular social group.72
1. Historical Context
To understand what membership in a particular social
group is grounds for asylum, this section details why this cate-
gory was originally included in the refugee definition and how it
has been interpreted over the years in U.S. asylum law. This
category was added to the 1951 Geneva Convention 73 by the
Swedish delegation in recognition of the fact that "experience
ha[s] shown that certain refugees ha[ve] been persecuted be-
cause they belong to particular social groups. Th[e] draft Con-
vention [makes] no provision for such cases, and one designed
to cover them should be accordingly included." 74 When Con-
gress enacted the 1980 Refugee Act,75 it also included "particular
social group" as an enumerated ground for asylum without fur-
ther explanation of its particular applicability. 76 However, it is
important to note that almost thirty years had passed between
the Refugee Act and the original inclusion of the social group
terminology in the Convention.77 During that period commenta-
tors began to sketch the boundaries of the social group concept,
and Congress gave no indication that it intended to reject those
developments. 78
Academics have engaged in discourse on the topic of what
the language "particular social group" encompasses. Atle Grahl-
Madsen, a pre-eminent scholar on international refugee law, ex-
pressed the belief that the social group category was added to
the Convention to protect against the persecution that would
arise from unforeseen circumstances, and should be broadly
interpreted. 79 Other scholars commenting on the interpretation
72. See definition of "refugee" supra note 4.
73. See Geneva Convention supra note 23 at art. 1(A)(2). This definition was ex-
panded by the Protocol, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No.
6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 8791, which was drafted to protect persons who became refugees
as a result of events which took place after January 1, 1951. The United States is not
a signatory to the Convention but only to the Protocol.
74. Fullerton, supra note 26, at 509 (quoting U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.3, at 14
(1951)).
75. The Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
76. See id.
77. See Fullerton, supra note 26, at 514.
78. See id.
[Vol. 43
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terpreted. 79 Other scholars commenting on the interpretation of
social group within the context of American asylum law have
also argued for a broad interpretation.80
2. Judicial Application
Since the legislature gave no direction as to what the social
group category entails, judicial application of this category has
varied. In the leading case on social group, In re Acosta,81 the BIA
applied the doctrine of ejusdem generis82 to give a meaning to
"particular social group" that was consistent with the other four
categories for asylum. 83 Recognizing that the other four grounds
for asylum describe "persecution aimed at an immutable charac-
teristic," the Board found persecution based on social group to
be defined by common characteristics that members of the group
either cannot change or should not be required to change be-
cause they are fundamental to their individual identities.84 The
Board stated that "[t]he shared characteristic might be an innate
one such as sex, color, or kinship ties," and that "[t]he particular
kind of group characteristic that will qualify under this construc-
tion remains to be determined on a case-by-case basis."85 Unless
otherwise articulated by a circuit court decision, this test is bind-
ing on all immigration courts analyzing a social group basis for
an asylum claim. 86
In Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 87 the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals announced a different test than the one promulgated by
the BIA.88 In Sanchez-Trujillo, the court outlined a four-part test
for determining whether an applicant is a member of a "particu-
lar social group." 89 First, it must be shown that the class of peo-
79. 1 ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
219 (1966)
80. See Goldberg, supra note 13, at 591.
81. 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985).
82. "A canton of construction holding that when a general word or phrase fol-
lows an enumeration of specific persons or things, the general word or phrase will
be construed as applying only to persons or things within of the class within which
the specific falls." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 218 (Pocket ed. 1996).
83. See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985).
84. See id. at 233-34.
85. Id. at 233.
86. See Goldberg, supra note 13, at 594.
87. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986).
88. Compare Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986), with In re
Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985).
89. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1573-74 (9th Cir. 1986).
2003]
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ple that the applicant claims comprises the group is cognizable
as a "particular social group" under the immigration statutes.90
Second the applicant must establish that she qualifies as a
member of the group.91 Third, the applicant must demonstrate
that the claimed "social group" has in fact been targeted for per-
secution on account of the characteristics of the group mem-
bers.92 Finally, the court must determine whether such "special
circumstances" are present to justify that mere membership in
that social group constitutes per se eligibility for asylum.93 The
Sanchez-Trujillo court then interpreted the statute and concluded
that the "term does not encompass every broadly defined seg-
ment of a population."94 The court further found that "[o]f cen-
tral concern is the existence of a voluntary associational relation-
ship among the purported members, which imparts some
common characteristic that is fundamental to their identity as a
member of that discrete social group."95
The distinct test applied by the Ninth Circuit has not proven
influential outside of that circuit. 96 The Ninth Circuit recently
clarified the Sanchez-Trujillo test in Hernandez-Montiel v. INS.97
The court refined the social group test by articulating that a
group is "one united by a voluntary association, including a
former association, or by an innate characteristic that is so fun-
damental to the identities or consciences of its members that
members either cannot or should not be required to change it."98
The court found that this test harmonized the holding of San-
chez-Trujillo with that announced by the BIA in In re Acosta.99
90. Id. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000).
91. See Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1574-75 (9th Cir. 1986).
92. See id. at 1575.
93. See id. at 1576. See also OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE
STATUS at para. U.N. Doc. HCR/PRO/4 (1979). "Mere membership in a particular
social group will not normally be enough to substantiate a claim to refugee status.
There may, however, be special circumstances where mere membership can be a suf-
ficient ground to fear persecution." Id. at para. 79.
94. Id.
95. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986).
96. See, e.g., Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that "[t]he
Ninth Circuit's requirement of a 'voluntary associational relationship,' read liter-
ally, conflicts with Acosta's immutability requirement").
97. Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that a gay
Mexican man with female sexual identity is a member of a particular social group).
98. Id. at 1093.
99. Id. at 1093 n.6.
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3. Gender as a "Particular Social Group"
Over the years, courts have taken different views on
whether gender, either alone or coupled with other characteris-
tics, can constitute a "particular social group."100 In Fatin v.
INS,101 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that an Iranian
applicant, who feared persecution for being a woman, qualified
as a member of a particular social group under the Immigration
and Nationality Act 02 In contrast, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals stated that gender alone could not constitute a "social
group."10 3 The court held that "[p]ossession of broadly-based
characteristics such as youth and gender will not by itself endow
individuals with membership in a particular group."104
In 1995 the DOJ circulated a memorandum to all INS Asy-
lum Offices regarding gender asylum claims. 105 The DOJ Guide-
lines106 suggested that gender could provide the basis for mem-
bership in a particular social group, in light of the BIA's
statement in In re Acosta that "sex" might be the type of shared
characteristic that could define a social group.107 Additionally,
the DOJ Guidelines found this view consistent with the ap-
proach taken by the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) Executive Committee, of which the United
States is a member.108
100. See Memorandum from Phyllis Coven, Office of International Affairs, U.S.
Department of Justice, Considerations For Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum
Claims From Women, to all INS Asylum Officers and HQASM Coordinators (May
26, 1995) [hereinafter DOJ Guidelines].
101. Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993).
102. See id. at 1241-42.
103. Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir.1991).
104. Id. at 664. The Second Circuit found that the social group the applicant
claimed (women who have been previously battered and raped by Salvadoran
guerillas) did not possess common characteristics other than gender or youth; char-
acteristics which on their own did not constitute a "social group." Additionally, the
court noted that the evidence presented provided no indication that the applicant
would be singled out for further persecution or that she was more likely to be per-
secuted by Salvadoran guerillas than other women. See id.
105. See DOJ Guidelines, supra note 100.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 14.
108. See id. The DOJ Guidelines included a quote from the UNHCR Executive
Committee that:
recognized that States, in the exercise of their sovereignty, are free to adopt
the interpretation that women asylum-seekers who face harsh or inhu-
mane treatment due to their having transgressed the social mores of the
society in which they live may be considered a "particular social group"
within the meaning of Article 1 A(2) of the 1951 United Nations Refugee
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III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
In light of the fact that the international community has
taken affirmative steps in recent years to address the problem of
gender-based violence,10 9 it seems appropriate for the United
States to take measures to conform its domestic asylum law to
these international trends. As the law stands now, with no spe-
cific recognition of gender as a basis for claiming asylum,110 a
woman seeking asylum based on her well-founded fear of per-
secution due to domestic violence would have several substan-
tial legal hurdles to overcome before she could succeed in her
asylum claim.
The main question is whether the DOJ's proposed rule suf-
ficiently tackles the barriers established by the BIA in In re R-A-
and provides an adequate framework for asylum adjudicators to
address claims based on domestic violence.1 If not, then what
portions of the rule could be better articulated to address asylum
claims based on domestic violence?112
Since asylum applications based on domestic violence have
arisen only recently, 113 the DOJ and the INS have not yet articu-
lated how courts should adjudicate such claims with enough
specificity to provide uniform application of the law.114 Given
the gravity of the outcome of asylum claims for individual ap-
plicants, whether adjudicators now have sufficient guidance on
the subject or whether there is still room for improvement re-
mains and important question.115
Convention.
Conclusion on the International Protection of Refugees, adopted by the UNHCR Ex-
ecutive Committee Programme, 36th Sess., No. 39(k) (1985).
109. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
111. See infra Part IV.B.
112. See infra Part V.
113. See Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,589 (pro-
posed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
114. See DOJ Guidelines, supra note 100, at 1.
115. See infra Part V.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. In re R-A-116
In In re R-A-, the leading case to date on domestic violence
as a basis for asylum, the BIA found that the applicant did not
qualify for asylum under the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA).117 In reaching its conclusion, the Board found that the
"existence of shared descriptive characteristics is not necessarily
sufficient to qualify those possessing the common characteristics
as members of a 'particular social group." ' 118 In addition, the
Board found that the applicant failed to demonstrate the requi-
site nexus between the persecution and her membership in the
claimed social group.1 9 In its decision in this case, the Board es-
tablished several new hurdles for women attempting to gain
asylum based on domestic violence. 20
The applicant, a Guatemalan woman, testified to the sever-
ity of the abuse she suffered over several years at the hands of
her husband.'21 From the beginning of the marriage, her hus-
band tormented her both sexually and physically. 22 When the
applicant became distraught from the repeated abuse, she at-
tempted to escape by taking refuge with various family mem-
bers, including her brother and parents.123 However, every time
she escaped, her husband managed to find her and force her to
return home with him. 24 After one such occasion, her husband
woke her in the middle of the night, "struck her face, whipped
her with an electrical cord, pulled out a machete and threatened
to deface her, to cut off her arms and legs, and leave her in a
wheelchair if she ever tried to leave him."125 The applicant at-
116. Hein's Interim Decisions Service, Interim Decision 3403 (B.I.A. 1999), vacated
by Attorney General, remanded to BIA. In addition to basing her asylum claim "on
account of" her membership in a particular social group, the applicant alternatively
based her asylum claim "on account of" her political opinion or imputed political
opinion. See id. However, that claim is beyond the scope of this comment and will
not be discussed.
117. See id. at 2.
118. Id. at 1.
119. See id. at 1.
120. See id. at 6-14.
121. See id. at 3-5.
122. See In re R-A-, Hein's Interim Decisions Service, Interim Decision 3403, at 3
(B.I.A. 1999), vacated by Attorney General, remanded to BIA.
123. See id. at 4.
124. See id.
125. Id.
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tempted to gain protection from the police on several occasions,
but the police refused to become involved.1 26 Her husband's
former military service and resultant familiarity with local law
enforcement officials made calling the police futile. 127 Distressed
by her situation, the applicant even sought judicial intervention,
but the judge she appeared before informed her that "he would
not interfere in domestic disputes."128 When asked about why
she believed her husband treated her in this horrible manner, the
applicant testified, "he saw her 'as something that belonged to
him and he could do anything he wanted' with her."129 Finally,
the applicant decided to leave permanently, and with help, man-
aged to flee Guatemala and come to the United States.130
At the outset the Board recognized that in rendering the de-
cision the immigration judge relied, in part, on the DOJ Guide-
lines.131 The Board went on to state that although the DOJ Guide-
lines establish various considerations for addressing social
group claims, they fail to set forth definitive instructions on how
to specifically address such claims. 32 Therefore, the Board de-
termined that the DOJ Guidelines were not controlling on
whether domestic violence may qualify a female applicant as a
"refugee" under domestic asylum law.133 Significantly, the
Board's determination nullified the judge in In re R-A-'s percep-
tion of how gender-based asylum claims should be adjudicated.
The judge based this on the considerations set forth by the DOJ
Guidelines, which allowed the Board to apply the law as it saw
fit.134
The Board highlighted the fact that in 1996 Congress created
specific forms of relief, outside the context of asylum law, for
some women living in or escaping from situations involving
domestic violence. 135 It found this legislation significant, given
126. See id. at 5.
127. See id.
128. In re R-A-, Hein's Interim Decisions Service, Interim Decision 3403, at 6
(B.I.A. 1999), vacated by Attorney General, remanded to BIA.
129. Id. at 4.
130. See id. at 5.
131. See id. at 9.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See In re R-A-, Hein's Interim Decisions Service, Interim Decision 3403, at
16-17 (B.IA. 1999), vacated by Attorney General, remanded to BIA.
135. See § 240A(b)(2) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (b)(2) (Supp. II 1996) (cancella-
tion of removal for spouses battered by a permanent resident or United States citi-
zen); § 244(a)(3) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (a)(3) (1994) (suspension of deportation
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that Congress failed to simultaneously make comparable
changes to the refugee definition or the asylum statute to ad-
dress claims of battered spouses.136 Due to congressional inac-
tion, the Board questioned whether "Congress intended or ex-
pected that our immigration laws, even in the refugee or asylum
context, would cover battered spouses leaving marriages to
aliens having no ties to the United States." 137
Refusing to be bound by the DOJ Guidelines and its inter-
pretation of Congress' silence, the Board analyzed the case by
looking at how the other grounds of the statute's "on account
of" clause operate.138 However, given that the social group cate-
gory was arguably included to address situations where the
other grounds are not applicable, 139 and the relative uniqueness
of domestic violence as a basis for the "social group" category,
the Board's conclusions seem ill-applied.
The Board agreed with the immigration judge that the ap-
plicant's extensive injuries rose to the level of persecution, and
that she was unable to obtain state assistance in ending such
persecution. 140 Therefore, the definitive issue in the case was
whether the applicant demonstrated that the harm she suffered
was, or in the future may be, inflicted "on account of" a statuto-
rily protected ground.141 In its analysis, the Board embarked on
an extensive discussion of whether the applicant demonstrated a
cognizable social group of which she was a member and
whether there was a sufficient nexus between her persecution
and her membership in that group.142
In discussing the cognizableness of the social group identi-
fied by the applicant,143 the Board initially applied the social
group test articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Sanchez-Trujillo
and found that a voluntary associational relationship was miss-
for spouses battered by a permanent resident or United States citizen).
136. See In re R-A-, Hein's Interim Decisions Service, Interim Decision 3403, at 9
(B.I.A. 1999), vacated by Attorney General, remanded to BIA.
137. Id.
138. See id.
139. See supra text accompanying note 79.
140. See In re R-A-, Hein's Interim Decisions Service, Interim Decision 3403, at 10
(B.I.A. 1999), vacated by Attorney General, remanded to BIA
141. See id.
142. See id. at 14-21.
143. See id. at 14. The Board identified the social group as that of "Guatemalan
women who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male companions,
who believe that woman are to live under male domination." Id.
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ing from the claimed classification. 144 Additionally, it stated that
in order for a social group to be viable under asylum law, there
must be "some showing of how the characteristic is understood
in the alien's society, such that [the Board], in turn, may under-
stand that the potential persecutors in fact see persons sharing
the characteristic as warranting suppression or the infliction of
harm."145 Although the Board asserted that it is not determina-
tive whether the claimed characteristic is prominent within a so-
ciety,146 this additional requirement created a further hurdle for
an applicant-she must show that others in her society view this
characteristic as "prominent" or "important. " 147 More impor-
tantly, the Board created this added obstacle without referring to
precedent dealing with the social group requirement.1 48 In fact,
the Board's addition seemed to stem from a "slippery-slope" ar-
gument that without this consideration the social group category
would virtually swallow the entire refugee definition.149 How-
ever, since asylum is an individual remedy, the applicant would
still be required to establish her eligibility under the refugee
definition, thus nullifying the Board's assertion.150
The next step in the Board's analysis was directed at deter-
mining the nexus between the harm suffered by the applicant
"on account of" her membership in a social group, particularly
"Guatemalan women who have been involved intimately with
Guatemalan male companions, who believe that women are to
live under male domination."151 It articulated the "on account
144. See id. The Board applied the precedent of the Ninth Circuit because that is
the district in which this Board was located.
145. Id. at 14.
146. See In re R-A-, Hein's Interim Decisions Service, Interim Decision 3403, at 15
(B.I.A. 1999), vacated by Attorney General, remanded to BIA.
147. See id.
148. See id. Although the Board made reference to this requirement's presence in
In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1990), it is important to note that in that
case the social group identified was composed of women in a particular tribe who
opposed the practice of female genital mutilation (FGM). Thus, the "important so-
cietal attribute" in that context was the performance of a traditional tribal ritual,
which was openly practiced. In contrast, given the private nature of domestic vio-
lence, it will almost never be shown conclusively to be "important" within a given
society. Additionally, in In re Kasinga, the Board did not articulate that it reached its
decision on accepting the social group definition based on the "importance" or
"prominence" of the group in society at large. See id.
149. See id. at 15-16.
150. See Kelly, supra note 14, at 656.
151. In re R-A-, Hein's Interim Decisions Service, Interim Decision 3403, at 17
(B.IA. 1999), vacated by Attorney General, remanded to BIA.
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of" test as directing "an inquiry into the 'motives of the entity ac-
tually inflicting the harm," to resolve whether the persecutor's
actions were due to the applicant's membership in the asserted
social group.1 52 The Board viewed the fact that the persecutor in
this case targeted only his wife, and no other females, as proof
that no nexus was present, but rather that this husband simply
wished to harm his wife.153 Additionally, it focused on societal
attitudes and the government's response, deducing that domes-
tic violence is not viewed as desirable in Guatemala, that it is an
acknowledged problem, and that some governmental action has
been taken to respond to it.154 These two additional requirements
applied in In re R-A- established further barriers to domestic vio-
lence claims than previously present in asylum case law.
The dissent articulated several problems with the Board's
decision. 5 5 First, it recognized that the DOJ Guidelines 156 specifi-
cally assert that domestic violence can be an instance where
there is a fundamental breakdown in state protection, thus trig-
gering the application of refugee law. 157 Furthermore, it articu-
lated that the DOJ Guidelines were promulgated to address the
disparity between the more private forms of persecution, typi-
cally suffered by women, and the more public forms of persecu-
tion, typically suffered by men. 58 The dissent explicitly focused
on the fact that domestic violence is a gender-based crime, in
which the essential purpose "is to punish, humiliate, and exer-
cise power over the victim on account of her gender," and thus
does not often exist beyond the confines of the relationship be-
tween the persecutor and the applicant. 159 In addition, the dis-
sent recognized that the persecutor knew that, through subject-
ing his wife to his subordination, she would not receive any
protection from authorities if she attempted to resist his abuse or
seek help. 60 Thus, despite the fact that Guatemalan society does
not officially sanction domestic violence, the country is domi-
152. See id. at 17-18.
153. See id.
154. See id. at 19. However, right before this assertion the Board recognizes that
"the views of society and of many governmental institutions in Guatemala can re-
sult in the tolerance of spouse abuse at levels we find appalling." Id.
155. See id. at 28-49.
156. See DOJ Guidelines, supra note 100.
157. See In re R-A-, Hein's Interim Decisions Service, Interim Decision 3403, at
30-31 (B.I.A. 1999), vacated by Attorney General, remanded to BIA.
158. See id. at 40.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 40.
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nated by extremely patriarchal views, firmly rooted in Guatema-
lan society,161 which preclude abused women from seeking state
remedies.
B. The Proposed Rule
The dissent's criticism of the majority's application of asy-
lum law in In re R-A- emphasized the need for the DOJ to further
clarify the Guidelines for adjudicators dealing with domestic
violence asylum claims. 162 It also highlighted the need for the
DOJ to specifically address the application of the "particular so-
cial group" criterion in asylum jurisprudence in order for appli-
cants and adjudicators alike to better understand this issue.163
The proposed rule was introduced to address these exact issues
and to eliminate "certain barriers that the In re R-A- decision
seems to pose to claims that domestic violence.., rises to the
level of persecution of a person on account of membership in a
particular social group." 164 However, the DOJ explicitly stated
that the proposed rule did not address the precise characteristics
that might categorize a "particular social group," since each case
will encompass a very particular set of facts. 65 Given this vari-
ability, the proposed rule states general principles that "will al-
low for case-by-case adjudication of claims based on domestic
violence."'166
1. State Action Requirement
Despite extensive case law imputing responsibility to a state
for actions by private actors whom the government is unable or
unwilling to control, there has been minimal formal guidance on
the issue.167 The rule proposed by the DOJ formally incorporates
this precedent and sets forth a standard to measure what quali-
fies as government unwillingness or inability.168 The rule estab-
lishes that the threshold the government must meet is whether it
has "take[n] reasonable steps to control the infliction of harm or
161. See id. at 40.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 136-141.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 129-135.
164. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,589 (proposed
Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See Springer, supra note 44, at 3.
168. See Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,591 (pro-
posed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
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suffering and whether the applicant has reasonable access to the
state protection that exists." 169 It then proceeds to state a non-
exhaustive list of evidentiary considerations that an adjudicator
may take into account when determining if state responsibility
should be imputed. 70 The proposed rule further establishes that
the applicant has the burden of providing evidence that will
demonstrate that this standard has been met.171 Ultimately, the
rule acknowledges that "no government is able to guarantee the
safety of each of its citizens at all times."172
The codification of judicial precedent on this issue is very
important. It provides conclusively that an adjudicator may im-
pute the acts of private individuals to the state if the state can-
not, or will not, control such actors. 7 3 However, the language is
not without its critics. Commentators have suggested that the
inclusion of the non-exclusive list may lead adjudicators to be-
lieve that the list is determinative, since the list is mentioned
only in the preamble, not in the actual regulation.7 4 Also, some
worry that any government action may be considered "reason-
able" without inquiring into whether that action actually sought
to eliminate the well-founded fear of persecution. 7 5
In the domestic violence context, the above concerns are es-
pecially relevant. The fact that a government has made it illegal
to commit such acts does not necessarily reflect that country's
treatment of the activity as criminal. 7 6 This is evinced by the ma-
jority's opinion in In re R-A-, which determined that the Guate-
malan government was willing to address the issue, and was
taking steps to deal with the problem. 77 In fact, the BIA found
that the applicant failed to demonstrate that the persecutor's ac-
tions "represent[ed] desired behavior within Guatemala or that
the Guatemalan Government encourages domestic abuse." 78 In
order to address such instances, the rule should include an in-
quiry into the actual circumstances in the country, and the actual
169. Id.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. Id.
173. See id.
174. See Springer, supra note 44, at 4.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See In re R-A-, Hein's Interim Decisions Service, Interim Decision 3403, at 20
(B.I.A. 1999), vacated by Attorney General, remanded to BIA.
178. Id.
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actions that the government has taken to ameliorate domestic
violence, not just a facial inquiry into the law on the books.17 9
2. Well-Founded Fear of Persecution
The language of the proposed rule indicates that persecu-
tion includes both an objective and a subjective component. The
rule states that persecution is "the infliction of objectively seri-
ous harm or suffering that is experienced as serious harm or suf-
fering by the applicant, regardless of whether the persecutor in-
tends to cause harm."180 It further states that this definition is not
intended to diminish the level of harm that has previously been
recognized as sufficient by the BIA and Courts of Appeals.181
The subjective component of the definition emphasizes the
applicant's need to experience the treatment as harm in order to
establish persecution. 82 Therefore, it is irrelevant whether the
persecutor possessed any putative or malignant intent to harm
the applicant.183 This language codified the BIA's ruling on per-
secution in In re Kasinga, where the Board had found intent by
the persecutor irrelevant to the inquiry.1 84 In relation to domestic
violence claims, it remains relatively uncomplicated to demon-
strate that what the applicant experienced was seriously harm-
ful, since a woman can testify to the level of harm she has suf-
fered and the seriousness of the effects that harm has had on
her. 8 5
However, the inclusion of language in the proposed rule re-
lating to the objective component of the harm or suffering alters
established precedent by requiring that such harm be "seri-
ous." 18 6 Commentators have expressed fear that the incorpora-
tion of this adjective may lead asylum adjudicators to heighten
179. See Nathalia Berkowitz & Catriona Jarvis, Asylum Gender Guidelines,
IMMIGRATION APPELLATE AUTH., at 2.B.2 (2000), available at
http://www.iaa.gov.uk/Genlnfo/IAA-Gender.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2002)
(stating that "the level of protection to be expected is a practical standard in keep-
ing with every state's primary duty to provide protection to those within its juris-
diction"). In addition, the Asylum Gender Guidelines state that "[t]he actual prac-
tice of the country should be considered rather than theory." Id. at 2.B.3.
180. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,597 (proposed
Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208.15(a)).
181. See id. at 76,590.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996).
185. See supra text accompanying note 37.
186. See Springer, supra note 44, at 2-3.
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the level of harm required to establish persecution, which could
result in the denial of valid asylum claims. 8 7 By including the
word "serious," the rule may act to further confuse, rather than
clarify, the meaning of persecution for claim handlers. Although
the explanation accompanying the rule indicates that adjudica-
tors should still refer to "other sources for guidance" when de-
fining persecution, 88 an adjudicator may interpret the addition
of the adjective "serious" as an indicator that the subjective focus
on defining persecution should be surpassed by an objective
definition. This language is included in the rule to help focus on
the applicant's subjective interpretation of the harm. As a result,
inclusion of the term "serious" could severely distract an adjudi-
cator's focus from the individual's perception-to an inquiry into
whether the harm is sufficiently egregious as to constitute
persecution. 189
In light of the fact that the rule was proposed to elucidate is-
sues raised in recent asylum claims based on domestic violence,
it seems that the inclusion of language completely new to estab-
lished case law blurs, rather than clarifies, the issue. The addi-
tion of the term "serious" may prove substantially problematic
for women fleeing situations of domestic violence, whose only
evidence of their suffering is their own testimony. It may be im-
possible for them to give objective proof of the harm they ex-
perienced without corroborating evidence or testimony, which
they may not be able to obtain.
3. "On Account of" Requirement
In order to satisfy the "on account of" requirement, the pro-
posed rule sets forth a two-part test. 90 First, the applicant must
demonstrate that the persecutor acted, "at least in part," based
upon the victim's protected characteristic. 191 Second, she must
show that the protected characteristic was a "central" motivation
for the persecutor's actions.' 92 However, the rule disregards an
imposition included in In re R-A-, by clarifying that an applicant
need not show evidence that the persecutor targeted others that
187. See id. at 3.
188. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,590 (proposed
Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
189. See Springer, supra note 44, at 3.
190. See Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,592 (pro-
posed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
191. Id. at 76,591.
192. See id. at 76,592.
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share the applicant's protected characteristic. 193 Although such
evidence may be considered if it is available, the rule specifically
states that "it shall not be required." 194 This formal acknowl-
edgment is significant for domestic violence victims because it
recognizes that the abuser may have the opportunity and moti-
vation to "harm only one of the women who share this [pro-
tected] characteristic, because only one of these women is in a
domestic relationship with the abuser." 195
The proposed language claims to comport with current case
law and "allows for the possibility that a persecutor may have
mixed motives" in carrying out his actions. 96 However, by in-
cluding the term "central," the rule seems to depart from several
established rulings on this issue. Previously, courts have held
that an applicant need only show that one of the motives for the
persecution relates to the protected ground. 197
The new language not only departs from established prece-
dent, but also substantially increases the applicant's evidentiary
burden.198 Requiring evidence that the protected characteristic
was "central" to the persecutor's motive forces the applicant, to
discern, from several possible motives, that the protected
ground was in fact the persecutor's main impetus for action.199
Although the rule is the DOJ's attempt to synchronize various
interpretations of the extent to which the persecutor's motiva-
tion must relate to the protected characteristic, 200 the use of the
word "central" may lead adjudicators to require an applicant to
demonstrate knowledge-motive she may not have or be able to
prove.
Perhaps a clearer, more realistic approach would be to re-
quire the applicant to satisfy the first part of the test, and end the
inquiry there. This part relates to evidence that indicates that
the protected ground was "at least" part of the persecutor's mo-
193. See id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 76,593.
196. Id. at 76,592.
197. See Tagaga v. INS, 228 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2000) ("We have held that a
petitioner for asylum need not prove that his well-founded fear of persecution is
based exclusively on a ground for refugee status .... Rather, so long as one of the
motives for the feared persecutory conduct relates to a protected ground, the peti-
tioner is entitled to that status.").
198. See Springer, supra note 44, at 5.
199. See id.
200. See Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,592 (pro-
posed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
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live. While some may argue this sets forth too lenient a standard,
it is the standard that has been applied by several Courts of Ap-
peals, and has thus evinced its appropriateness in asylum litiga-
tion.201
4. Membership in a Particular Social Group
In addressing the issue of "particular social group," the
proposed rule attempts to clarify the least well-defined ground
for asylum.202 The rule codifies the definition given in In re
Acosta, that a social group "is composed of members who share
a common, immutable characteristic, such as sex.., that a mem-
ber either cannot change or that is so fundamental to the identity
or conscience of the member that he or she should not be re-
quired to change it."203 The proposal explicitly states that gender
may form the basis of such a group,204 and that an applicant may
be able to show that the persecutor harmed her because of her
gender or because of her intimate relationship with the abuser.20 5
Further, in deciding whether an applicant cannot change, or
should not be expected to change the shared characteristic, the
rule directs an adjudicator to consider all relevant evidence, in-
cluding the applicant's particular situation and her country's
conditions or societal views.20 6
The language in this portion of the rule is extremely helpful
in focusing adjudicators on what is relevant in considering an
asylum claim based on membership in a particular social group.
Not only does the wording acknowledge that gender can be the
basis of a social group, but it also recognizes that gender is an
immutable characteristic that a woman cannot alter, and that of-
ten gender is the defining factor of a woman's persecution. 207
Moreover, this language focuses attention on circumstances
where a woman's involvement in an intimate relationship, in-
cluding marriage, may be considered immutable because she
could not reasonably be expected to leave or divorce due to reli-
gious, cultural, or legal constraints.208 These recognitions ac-
201. See Springer, supra note 174.
202. See Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,593 (pro-
posed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 76,588.
205. See id. at 76,593.
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. See Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,593 (pro-
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knowledge that the persecution that women suffer is often
rooted in long-standing societal norms concerning their respec-
tive roles, and that such norms are sanctioned by the state, either
expressly or by implication.
The rule goes on to enumerate a non-exhaustive list of addi-
tional factors that may be considered in examining whether a
particular social group exists in order to lend conformity to judi-
cial decisions on this issue.20 9 The first three factors are drawn
from the Ninth Circuit's decision in Sanchez-Trujillo.21o The DOJ
views these factors as "considerations that may be relevant in
some cases, but not as requirements for a particular social
group." 211 The final three factors are taken from the BIA's deci-
sion in In re R-A-, and are once again prefaced as considerations,
but not requirements. 212 The rule also explains that evidence re-
lating to societal attitudes about the group members could be
relevant in determining the applicability of the enumerated fac-
tors, including whether societal institutions provide fewer pro-
tections or benefits to members of the group than to society at
large.213
Some commentators have expressed fear that the inclusion
of the list of factors, despite its predication as a consideration
rather than a requirement, might lead adjudicators to rely exclu-
sively on the factors enumerated as determinative. 2 4 This con-
cern seems relevant, given the expressed statements by the DOJ
about the proposed rule that it is attempting to develop "broadly
applicable principles" rather than bright-line rules.21 5 In light of
that goal, inclusion of such a list may be counter-productive if it
risks leading adjudicators to rely on those factors as conclusive
in defining what constitutes a particular social group in any
posed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
209. See id. at 76,594. The list of factors is (1) close affiliation between members;
(2) a common interest among members; (3) a voluntary relationship exists among
them; (4) the group is a societal faction or recognized segment of the population; (5)
members view themselves as members of the group; and (6) society distinguishes
members of the group for different treatment or status than others in society. See id.
210. 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986).
211. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,594 (proposed
Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See Springer, supra note 44, at 5.
215. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,595 (proposed
Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
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given case. 216 However, the validity of such concerns will not be
tested until the rule is implemented and there is evidence of how
adjudicators are using the list in their decisions.
V. PROPOSAL
The international community has taken only conservative
measures to bring attention to the problem of domestic violence.
The United States, as a global super-power and proponent of in-
ternational human rights, should take steps to align domestic
asylum law with recent international legal movements that have
begun to recognize domestic violence as a possible basis for an
asylum claim.
Specifically, the U.S. standards should focus on whether
"the violence-experienced or feared-is a serious violation of a
fundamental human right for a [Geneva] Convention ground
and in what circumstances ... the risk of that violence [can] be
said to result from a failure of state protection." 217 Focusing
upon whether the infliction of harm or suffering was "upon per-
sons who differ in a way regarded as offensive" 218 would direct
the persecution inquiry in a manner consistent with existing
precedent. 219 Finally, the true inquiry should rest upon whether
the state actually was able or willing to address the persecution.
Then, in assessing the violence, such factors as social, cultural,
traditional, and religious norms, as well as the laws affecting
women in the applicant's country, should be analyzed in light of
existing human rights instruments that provide standards for
recognizing the specific protection needs of women.220
The guidelines adopted by the Canadian Immigration and
Refugee Board (CIRB) in 1993, to help adjudicators deal with
female refugee applicants who feared gender-based persecution,
could serve as a model for a successful U.S. program.221 The
guidelines recognized that the "circumstances which give rise to
women's fear of persecution are often unique to women" and as
216. See Springer, supra note 44, at.5.
217. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD OF CANADA, WOMEN REFUGEE
CLAIMANTS FEARING GENDER-RELATED PERSECUTION (1996) [hereinafter CANADIAN
GUIDELINES], available at http://www.irb.gc.ca/en/about/legal/
guidline/women/GD4 CE.htm (last updated June 28, 2002).
218. See Springer, supra note 44, at 3.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra note 217.
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such, must be specifically addressed by asylum law.222 Addi-
tionally, the CIRB stated that membership in a particular social
group could be defined solely by gender, regardless of the large
numbers included in such a group.223 The guidelines expressly
acknowledged that, "women face violence amounting to perse-
cution, because of their particular vulnerability as women in
their societies and because they are so unprotected." 224 Since asy-
lum is an individual remedy, a woman would still need to show
that the facts in her particular case sufficiently qualify her to re-
ceive the remedy of asylum based upon gender violence. This
requirement would eliminate legislators' fear that all women
who find themselves in situations of domestic violence will le-
gally qualify for asylum. 225
Reflection upon the language of the above guidelines
promulgated by the CIRB indicates that the DOJ's proposed rule
lacks sufficient clarity. In fact, the CIRB guidelines plainly rec-
ognize that "although gender is not specifically enumerated as
one of the grounds for establishing Convention refugee status,
the definition of Convention refugee may properly be interpreted
as providing protection to women who demonstrate a well-
founded fear of gender-related persecution." 226 Such definitive
language is not present in the DOJ's proposed rule and is neces-
sary to direct adjudicators' attention to the underlying goal the
DOJ is attempting to address-allowing gender-based asylum
claims that satisfy the statutory definition of "refugee."
Thus, despite the stated goal of establishing broadly appli-
cable principles to guide asylum adjudicators, the proposed rule
instead provides specific and rather limiting language in regards
to the components of the legal definition of "refugee." 227 By
specifying that the asylum inquiry should be conducted in such
a manner, asylum law in the United States would begin to be
compatible with current international practices by acknowledg-
ing the particular problems that women in the world face.
VI. CONCLUSION
Domestic violence is a severe problem that affects women in
222. Id.
223. See id.
224. Id.
225. See id.
226. Id.
227. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000).
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all parts of the world. Despite initial steps by the international
community to address this issue, it is uncertain how long it will
be before deep-rooted social, cultural, and religious norms re-
garding the role of women in society will change globally so that
domestic violence will be recognized as a fundamental violation
of women's human rights. In light of this situation, it is impera-
tive that the United States take strategic steps to harmonize do-
mestic asylum law with growing international trends towards
recognizing gender-based asylum claims. In spite of any under-
lying fear that such recognition would open the floodgates to a
potentially enormous group of women, asylum remains an indi-
vidual remedy that should be made available to those battered
women who satisfy every element of the law. While the DOJ's
proposed rule is an important development in providing asylum
adjudicators with guidance on the issue, as this comment indi-
cates, there is still much more that needs to be done to establish
domestic violence as the basis for a legitimate asylum claim.
POSTSCRIPT
As this issue went to press, Attorney General John Ashcroft
had taken decisive action that could severely curtail asylum
claims based on gender-related violence, including domestic vio-
lence. On March 1, 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service officially merged into the Department of Homeland Se-
curity. However, the Attorney General still maintained jurisdic-
tion over immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals (BIA). Attorney General Ashcroft stated in testimony
given before the Senate on March 4, 2003, that he has certified
the In re R-A- decision to himself for review. Informed sources
suspect that he will reinstate the decision of the BIA in In re R-A-
, which denied the applicant asylum because her abuse was not
perpetrated by a government, and because she was an individ-
ual and not a member of a "particular social group." Addition-
ally, it is believed that the Attorney General will completely re-
vamp the proposed regulations, signaling a change in policy and
law that will impact all women and girls fleeing gender-based
violence perpetrated by non-state actors.
Such action would not only have grave consequences for
the applicant in In re R-A-, who will be deported back to Guate-
mala to face potentially lethal consequences at the hands of her
abuser, but for women and girls fleeing such horrific human
2003]
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rights abuses as trafficking, sexual slavery, and honor killing.
As other countries such as Canada and Great Britain take steps
to align domestic immigration law with a growing international
awareness surrounding unique human rights abuses based on
gender, the United States could become further out of sync with
international refugee law if Attorney General Ashcroft does in-
deed follow the suspected course of action detailed above. It
remains to be seen what the final outcome will be, but the pros-
pect for successful gender-based asylum claims in the United
States appears to be grim.
